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Abstract—A secret key agreement setup between three users is
considered in which each of the users 1 and 2 intends to share a
secret key with user 3 and users 1 and 2 are eavesdroppers with
respect to each other. The three users observe i.i.d. outputs of
correlated sources and there is a generalized discrete memoryless
multiple access channel (GDMMAC) from users 1 and 2 to user 3
for communication between the users. The secret key agreement
is established using the correlated sources and the GDMMAC.
In this setup, inner and outer bounds of the secret key capacity
region are investigated. Moreover, for a special case where the
channel inputs and outputs and the sources form Markov chains
in some order, the secret key capacity region is derived. Also a
Gaussian case is considered in this setup.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secret key sharing between two legitimate users in the pres-
ence of an eavesdropper was considered in [1] and [2] in the
source and the channel model. In the source model, all the
three users could observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources
and there was a noiseless public channel with unlimited
capacity for communication between the two legitimate users,
through which all communications could be intercepted by the
eavesdropper. In [1], secret key capacity is characterized in the
source model when the noiseless public channel is one-way. In
[3], secret key sharing in a source model with public channel
of limited capacity is investigated in which there is a helper
with access to source observations correlated with the others
observations. In [4], the same problem of sharing a secret key
is investigated in the source model where instead of the public
channel, there is a noisy broadcast channel from the transmitter
to the receiver and the eavesdropper. In [5], secret key sharing
was considered in a framework where two users intended to
share secret keys with a base station and the two users were
eavesdroppers of each other’s key. In [5], all the three users
can observe i.i.d. outputs of correlated sources and there is a
noiseless public channel with unlimited capacity from users 1
and 2 to user 3.
Motivated by the above works, we consider secret key
sharing in a framework similar to [5] but in more conformity
with real communication scenarios since the realization of
public channel with unlimited capacity is not compatible with
the noisy nature of wireless networks. Hence, instead of
public channels with unlimited capacity, we consider noisy
channels for communication between the users. Each of the
users 1 and 2, as network users, intends to share a secret
key with user 3, as a base station, and users 1 and 2 are the
eavesdroppers with respect to each other. The three users have
access to correlated sources and there is a generalized discrete
memoryless multiple access channel (GDMMAC) to transmit
the required information from users 1 and 2 to user 3. Users
1 and 2 govern the channel inputs of the GDMMAC and each
of the three users receives his corresponding output from the
channel. Each of the users 1 and 2 generates a secret key from
his observations and sends the required information via the
GDMMAC to user 3. Users 1 and 2 use the channel outputs to
eavesdrop each other’s key. For this setup, we derive an inner
bound of the secret key capacity region in which a combination
of wiretap codebook and secret key generation codebook along
with Wyner-Ziv codebook is used. Furthermore, an explicit
outer bound of the secret key capacity region is given and for
a special case, the secret key capacity region is derived. Also,
the problem is discussed in a Gaussian case.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section
II, the proposed model is described. In Section III, our main
results are given. A special case is investigated in Section
IV. A Gaussian example is discussed in Section V. Conclu-
sion and suggestions for future works are given in Section
VI. Proofs of the theorems are presented in Appendices.
Throughout the paper, a random variable is denoted with an
upper case letter (e.g X) and its realization is denoted with
the corresponding lower case letter (e.g., x). We use XNi
to indicate vector (Xi,1, Xi,2, ..., Xi,N ), and Xki,j to indicate
vector (Xi,j , Xi,j+1, ..., Xi,k), where i denotes the index of
the corresponding user.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Users 1, 2 and 3 observe correlated discrete memoryless
sources S1, S2 and S3, respectively, with joint distribution
PS1,S2,S3 in an i.i.d. manner. Furthermore, there is a GDM-
MAC with probability distribution PY1,Y2,Y3|X1,X2 , indepen-
dent of the sources, where users 1 and 2 govern the inputs X1
and X2, and then, outputs Y1, Y2 and Y3 are seen by users 1,
2 and 3, respectively. Each of users 1 and 2 intends to share
a secret keys with user 3 where user 1 is the eavesdropper of
user 2’s secret key and vice versa.
For the secret key agreement, users 1 and 2 generate
secret keys K1 and K2 as stochastic functions of the in-
formation available at them, i.e., SN1 and S
N
2 , respectively.
For i = 1, 2, ..., N , the i-th channel inputs X1,i and X2,i
are determined as stochastic mappings X1,i = f1,i(SN1 ) and
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X2,i=f2,i(S
N
2 ) by users 1 and 2, respectively. These inputs are
sent over the GDMMAC and then, channel outputs Y1,i, Y2,i
and Y3,i are observed by users 1, 2 and 3, respectively. User
3 computes estimates of keys K1 and K2 as:
(Kˆ1, Kˆ2) = g(Y
N
3 , S
N
3 ) (1)
where g is a deterministic function. Users 1 and 2 use the
channel outputs Y N1 and Y
N
2 to eavesdrop on each other’s
key, respectively. For simplicity, we assume that the number
of source observations is the same as the channel uses.
When these are not the same, the results can be deduced
by considering a normalization coefficient. All the keys and
random variables take values from some finite sets. Now, we
state the conditions that should be met in the described secret
key sharing framework as shown in Fig.1.
Definition 1: In the secret key agreement strategy of the
proposed model, the rate pair (R1, R2) is an achievable key
rate pair if for every ε > 0 and sufficiently large N , we have:
Pr{(K1,K2) 6= (Kˆ1, Kˆ2)} < ε (2)
1
N I(K1;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 ) < ε (3)
1
N I(K2;S
N
1 , X
N
1 , Y
N
1 ) < ε (4)
1
NH(K1) > R1 − ε and 1NH(K2) > R2 − ε (5)
Equation (2) means that user 3 correctly estimates the secret
keys and equations (3) and (4) mean that users 1 and 2
effectively have no information about each other’s secret keys.
Definition 2: The region containing all achievable secret
key rate pairs (R1, R2) is the secret key capacity region.
III. MAIN RESULTS
Now, we state the main result of the paper.
Theorem 1: In the described model, all rate pairs in the
closure of the convex hall of the set of all key rate pairs
(R1, R2) that satisfy the following region are achievable:
R1 > 0, R2 > 0
R1≤[I(U1;S3|U2)−I(U1;S2|U2)]++[I(V1;Y3|V2)−I(V1;Y2|V2, X2)]+,
R2≤[I(U2;S3|U1)−I(U2;S1|U1)]++[I(V2;Y3|V1)−I(V2;Y1|V1, X1)]+,
R1+R2≤[I(U1, U2;S3)−I(U1;S2|U2)−I(U2;S1|U1)−I(U1;U2)]+
+[I(V1, V2;Y3)−I(V1;Y2|V2, X2)−I(V2;Y1|V1, X1)]+
subject to the constraints:
I(U1;S1|U2, S3) ≤ I(V1;Y3|V2), I(U2;S2|U1, S3) ≤ I(V2;Y3|V1),
I(U1, U2;S1, S2|S3) ≤ I(V1, V2;Y3),
for random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite
sets according to the distributions:
p1(u1, u2, s1, s2, s3) = p(u1 |s1 )p(u2 |s2 )p(s1, s2, s3),
p1(v1,v2,x1,x2,y1,y2,y3)=p(v1)p(v2)p(x1|v1)p(x2|v2)p(y1,y2,y3|x1,x2).
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix I. Here, the
sketch of the proof is given. To derive this inner bound, a
part of the keys between the users is generated by using the
source common randomness and the other part is generated by
exploiting the channel common randomness. For this purpose,
we impose the separation strategy as in [4] to the GDMMAC.
At the first part of secret key sharing, users 1 and 2 generate
secret keys using source observations. To share these keys
with user 3, some information should be sent by users 1 and
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Fig. 1: Secret key sharing using correlated sources over GDMMAC
2 via the GDMMAC according to Wyner-Ziv codebook for
multiple sources as in [7] and this information should satisfy
the constraints of Theorem 1. The information sent by each
user is independent of his secret key. On the other hand,
the GDMMAC is noisy and not all of the information sent
by user 1 can be decoded by user 2 and vice versa. Hence,
part of the information sent via the GDMMAC can be itself
used for secret key generation exploiting the channel common
randomness. The latter rates are achievable if they belong to
the secrecy rate region of the GDMMAC in [6].
Proposition 1: The following region is an explicit outer
bound of the secret key capacity region in the described setup:
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(X1;Y3 |X2, Y2) + I(S1;S3 |S2) ,
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(X2;Y3 |X1, Y1) + I(S2;S3 |S1) ,
0 ≤ R1 +R2 ≤ I(X1, X2;Y3) + I(S1, S2;S3).
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix II.
It should be noted that the separation strategy used in
achievability may not be optimal in general and hence, we
could not yet derive the secret key capacity region. In the next
section, we investigate a special case where the rate region in
Theorem 1 can achieve the capacity region.
IV. SPECIAL CASE
In this section, we consider a special case of the general
problem discussed in the previous sections. This special case
arises when the channel inputs and outputs and the sources
form Markov chains as:
(X1, X2)−Y1−Y3, (X1, X2)−Y2−Y3, S1−S3−S2.
Also, we constrain a special condition to the channel such that
each of the channel inputs can be specified with access to the
receiver’s channel output and the other transmitter’s input or
in other words:
H(X1 |X2 , Y3) = 0, H(X2 |X1 , Y3) = 0.
In this case, the GDMMAC cannot itself provide secrecy;
due to the Markov chains between the inputs and outputs,
however, it can be used by users 1 and 2 to transmit the
required information of the source common randomness. The
secret key capacity region is given in the following theorem.
Theorem 2: In the mentioned special case of the described
setup, the secret key capacity region is the set of all rate pairs
(R1, R2) that satisfy:
R1 ≤ I(U1;S3 |S2) , R2 ≤ I(U2;S3 |S1) ,
subject to the constraints:
I(U1;S1|S3) ≤ I(X1;Y3|X2), I(U2;S2|S3) ≤ I(X2;Y3|X1),
I(U1;S1|S3) + I(U2;S2|S3) ≤ I(X1, X2;Y3),
for random variables taking values in sufficiently large finite
sets according to the distributions:
p(u1, u2, s1, s2, s3) = p(u1|s1)p(u2|s2)p(s1, s2, s3),
p1(x1, x2, y1, y2, y3) = p(x1)p(x2)p(y1, y2, y3|x1, x2).
The achievability can be deduced from Theorem 1 by substi-
tuting V1 = X1, V2 = X2 and employing the Markov chains.
The outer bound is proved in Appendix III. In this example,
the GDMMAC is used just to transmit the required source
common randomness information and hence, the problem can
be treated as a pure source model with rate limited public
channels. When the channel rates satisfy:
H(S1|S3) ≤ I(X1;Y3|X2), H(S2|S3) ≤ I(X2;Y3|X1),
H(S1, S2|S3) ≤ I(X1, X2;Y3),
the case is similar to the special case of the forward source
model of [5] where the secret key capacity is the union of all
rate pairs that satisfy:
R1 ≤ I(S1;S3 |S2) , R2 ≤ I(S2;S3 |S1) .
V. A GAUSSIAN EXAMPLE
As a scalar Gaussian example, we consider the case where the
source observations at the users are according to Markov chain
S1−S3−S2. Then, without loss of generality, we can model
them as S1 = S3 + Es,1, S2 = S3 + Es,2 where S3, Es,1 and
Es,2 are independent zero mean Gaussian variables with
variances P3, Ns,1 and Ns,2, respectively. The GDMMAC is
described by:
Y3=X1 +X2 + Ec,3, Y2=X1 +X2 + Ec,2, Y1=X1 +X2 + Ec,1,
in which Ec,i ∼ N (0, Nc,i) for i = 1, 2, 3 with the input
power constraints P1 and P2 at users 1 and 2, respectively.
By the standard arguments as the discrete channel arguments,
the results can be extended to Gaussian case. We consider:
V1 = X1, V2 = X2, S1 = U1 +D1, S2 = U2 +D2
in Theorem 1 where Ui∼N (0, PUi), Di∼N (0, P3+Ns,i−PUi)
and Ui is independent of Di for i = 1, 2.
By substituting the random variables as above in Theorem
1, the following proposition for secret key rate region can
be deduced for which the proof is relinquished due to space
limitation.
Proposition 2: (R1, R2) is an achievable key rate pair if is
satisfies the equations at the top of the next page.
For the values P1 = P2 = P3 = 1, Ns,1 = Ns,2 = Nc,3 =
0.5, the rate region is shown in Fig. 2 where Nc,1 = Nc,2
and they vary from 0.5 to 0.9. When Nc,1 = Nc,2 = 0.5, no
secret key can be generated through GDMMAC and the second
terms of the secret key rates bound in Proposition 2 will be
zero. In this case, the region is the secret key rate region of
a pure source model with rate limited public channels. When
these noises increase, the key rate region enlarges however
the sum rate boundary remains fixed since the sum rate term
related to channel common randomness is zero until these
noises amount to about Nc,1 = Nc,2 = 0.75. At this point,
the term related to the channel common randomness in the
sum rate bound would be positive and hence, the sum rate
bound increases. For Nc,1 = Nc,2 = 0.8, the rate region is
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Fig. 2: Secret key rate region for different values of Nc1 and Nc2
rectangular since each user’s rate bound in proposition 2 will
exceed the total sum rate bound. For Nc,1 = Nc,2 = 0.9, this
region becomes pentagonal as the sum rate due to channel
common randomness is increased such that the total sum rate
bound dominates each user’s rate bound.
VI. CONCLUSION
The problem of secret key sharing in a combined framework
with both source and the channel common randomness was
studied. For this problem, the inner bound and the explicit
outer bound of the secret key capacity region were derived.
The separation strategy used to achieve the inner bound was
not optimal in general, however, for the especial case where
the channel inputs and outputs and the sources form Markov
chains in some order, the secret key capacity region was
derived. It was shown that this case can be simulated as the
source model of key agreement with public channels of limited
capacity. As future work, the joint source channel coding can
be investigated instead of the separation strategy. In addition,
in a more practical scenario, some types of dependency
between the source and the channel can be supposed.
APPENDIX I
Proof of Theorem 1
We fix the distribution to be the same as in Theorem 1. Users 1
and 2 independently and randomly generate typical sequences
uN1 and u
N
2 , respectively, each with probability:
p(uN1 ) =
N∏
i=1
p(u1,i), p(u
N
2 ) =
N∏
i=1
p(u2,i).
The number of the sequences uN1 and u
N
2 are 2
N(I(U1;S1)+ε
′),
and 2N(I(U2;S2)+ε
′), respectively, in which ε′>0 can be chosen
arbitrarily small. Using two-layered random binning, they are
labeled as:
uN1 (k1S , k
′
1S , k
′′
1S),
k1S ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr1S)}, k′1S ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr
′
1S}, k′′1S ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr
′′
1S}
uN2 (k2S , k
′
2S , k
′′
2S),
k2S ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr2S)}, k′2S ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr
′
2S}, k′′2S ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr
′′
2S}
where:
r1S+r
′
1S=I(U1;S1)−I(U1;S2)+2ε′, r′′1S=I(U1;S2)−ε′, (6)
r2S+r
′
2S=I(U2;S2)−I(U2;S1)+2ε′, r′′2S=I(U2;S1)−ε′, (7)
It is obvious that r1S+r′1S+r
′′
1S = I(U1;S1)+ε
′ and so, each
sequence uN1 can be determined if the indices (k1S , k
′
1S , k
′′
1S)
are known. The same is true for uN2 .
R1 > 0, R2 > 0,
R1 ≤ 12 log(1 +
PU1P3Ns,2
((P3+Ns,1)2−PU1P3)(P3+Ns,2) ) +
1
2 [log(1 +
P1
Nc,3
)− log(1 + P1Nc,2 )]+,
R2 ≤ 12 log(1 +
PU2P3Ns,1
((P3+Ns,2)2−PU2P3)(P3+Ns,1) ) +
1
2 [log(1 +
P2
Nc,3)
)− log(1 + P2Nc,1 )]+,
R1 +R2 ≤ 12 log[(1 +
PU1P3Ns,2
((P3+Ns,1)2−PU1P3)(P3+Ns,2) )(1 +
PU2P3Ns,1
((P3+Ns,2)2−PU2P3)(P3+Ns,1) )]
+ 12 [log(1 +
P1+P2
Nc,3)
)− log(1 + P1Nc,2 )− log(1 + P2Nc,1 )]+
due to the constraints:
PU1 ≤ P1(P3+Ns,1)
2
Ns,1Nc,3+P1(P3+Ns,1)
, PU2 ≤ P2(P3+Ns,2)
2
Ns,2Nc,3+P2(P3+Ns,2)
,
(A1 − PU1)(A2 − PU2) ≥ A1A2 − (P1+P2)(P3+Ns,1)
2(P3+Ns,2)
2
A ,
A = Ns,1Ns,2Nc,3 + P3Nc,3(Ns,1 +Ns,2) + (P1 + P2)(P3 +Ns,1)(P3 +Ns,2),
A1 =
(P3+Ns,1)
2(Ns,2Nc,3+(P1+P2)(P3+Ns,2))
A , A2 =
(P3+Ns,2)
2(Ns,1Nc,3+(P1+P2)(P3+Ns,1))
A .
In addition to the secret key codebooks, the wiretap channel
codebooks are generated. Users 1 and 2 generate independent
sequences vN1 and v
N
2 , respectively, each with probability:
p(vN1 ) =
N∏
i=1
p(v1,i), p(v
N
2 ) =
N∏
i=1
p(v2,i)
The number of sequences vN1 and v
N
2 is 2
N(r1C+r
′
1C) and
2N(r2C+r
′
2C), respectively, which are labeled as:
vN1 (k1C , k
′
1C), k1C ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr1C}, k′1C ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr
′
1C}
vN2 (k2C , k
′
2C), k2C ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr2C}, k′2C ∈ {1, ..., 2Nr
′
2C}
where:
r′1C = I(V1;X2, Y2|V2)− ε′′, r′2C = I(V2;X1, Y1|V1)− ε′′ (8)
Two functions f1 and f2 are defined as:
f1 : V1 → K′1S , f2 : V2 → K′2S ,
K′1S = {1, ..., 2Nr
′
1S}, K′2S = {1, ..., 2Nr
′
2S},
where V1 and V2 are the set of 2N(r1C+r′1C) and 2N(r2C+r′2C)
codewords vN1 and v
N
2 , respectively. Mapping f1 is a random
partitioning of codewords vN1 into 2
Nr′1S equal-sized parts.
Elements of part i are labeled as (V1)i. Mapping f2 is similarly
defined. In the definition of f1, we assume that r1C+r′1C≥r′1S
and as we would see in the decoding step, this can be deduced
from the constraint of Theorem 1. The same is true for f2.
For encoding, when typical sequences sN1 and s
N
2 are
observed at users 1 and 2, respectively, sequences uN1 and
uN2 are chosen at the corresponding users such that (s
N
1 , u
N
1 )
and (sN2 , u
N
2 ) are ε
′−jointly typical. It can be seen that
these sequences are unique with high probability for arbi-
trarily small ε′. For the sequences uN1 (k1S , k
′
1S , k
′′
1S) and
uN2 (k2S , k
′
2S , k
′′
2S), the indices k1S and k2S are chosen by
users 1 and 2, respectively, to share with user 3 as the secret
keys due to the source observations. For this purpose, the
indices k′1S and k
′
2S are the required information to be sent
by users 1 and 2 to user 3. User 1 encodes k′1S in such a way
that he returns vN1 randomly chosen from (V1)k′2S using the
mapping f1. User 2 acts in a same way using mapping f2 and
returns vN2 . For the selected v
N
1 (k1C , k
′
1C) and v
N
2 (k2C , k
′
2C),
user 1 and 2, respectively, consider k1C and k2C to share
with user 3 as the secret keys due to the channel common
randomness. Then, the channel inputs xN1 and x
N
2 are sent
over GDMMAC according to the distributions p(x1|v1) and
p(x2|v2).
For decoding, user 3, first, chooses the sequences vN1
and vN2 which are ε1−jointly typical with the received yN3
where ε1 = ε8 . User 3 decodes key pair (k1C , k2C) if
(vN1 (k1C , k
′
1C), v
N
2 (k2C , k
′
2C), y
N
3 ) ∈ A(N)ε1 (PV1,V2,Y3), when
such (vN1 (k1C , k
′
1C), v
N
2 (k2C , k
′
2C)) exists and is unique. Oth-
erwise, it declares error. It can be shown that the decoding
error probability of this step is bounded as:
P
(N)
e1 ≤ ε1 + 2N(r1C+r
′
1C+r2C+r
′
2C−(I(V1,V2;Y3)−4ε1))+
2N(r1C+r
′
1C−(I(V1;Y3|V2)−3ε1))+2N(r2C+r
′
2C−(I(V2;Y3|V1)−3ε1)).
If we set:
r1C<I(V1;Y3|V2)−I(V1;X2,Y2|V2),r2C<I(V2;Y3|V1)−I(V2;X1,Y1|V1),
r1C + r2C < I(V1, V2;Y3)− I(V1;X2, Y2|V2)− I(V2;X1, Y1|V1),
then by substituting r′1C and r
′
2C from (8), we have:
P
(N)
e1 ≤ ε1 + 2N(−2ε
′′+4ε1) + 2N(−ε
′′+3ε1) + 2N(−ε
′′+3ε1).
By setting ε′′>3ε1= 3ε8 , for example ε
′′=4ε1= ε2 , we choose
N so large that 2N(−ε
′′+3ε1)≤ε1 , and then P (N)e1 ≤ 4ε1= ε2 .
After correct decoding (k1C , k′1C) and (k2C , k
′
2C), user 3 con-
siders k1C and k2C to share with users 1 and 2, respectively,
as the secret keys due to the channel common randomness.
Then, using functions f1 and f2, user 3 finds the mappings
(V1)i of the codeword vN1 and (V2)j of the codeword vN2
and sets k′1S = i, k
′
2S = j. Now, user 3 decodes sequences
uN1 (k1S , k
′
1S , k
′′
1S) and u
N
2 (k2S , k
′
2S , k
′′
2S) such that:
(uN1 (k1S , k
′
1S= i, k
′′
1S), u
N
2 (k2S , k
′
2S=j, k
′′
2S), s
N
3 )∈A(N)ε2 (PU1,U2,S3),
when such (uN1 (k1S , k
′
1S , k
′′
1S), u
N
2 (k2S , k
′
2S , k
′′
2S)) exists and
is unique. Otherwise, it declares error. For ε2 = ε16 , according
to Wyner-Ziv problem for multiple sources in [7], the decoding
error probability of this step is bounded as:
P
(N)
e2 ≤ ε2 + 2N(14ε2+I(U1,U2;S1,S2|S3)−(r
′
1S+r
′
2S))
+2N(7ε2+I(U1;S1|U2,S3)−r
′
1S) + 2N(7ε2+I(U2;S2|U1,S3)−r
′
2S).
If we set:
r1S < I(U1;S3|U2)− I(U1;S2|U2),
r2S < I(U2;S3|U1)− I(U2;S1|U1),
r1S+r2S<I(U1,U2;S3)−I(U1;S2|U2)−I(U2;S1|U1)−I(U1;U2),
then by substituting r′1S and r
′
2S from (6) and (7), we have:
P
(N)
e2 ≤ ε2 + 2N(14ε2−4ε
′) + 2N(7ε2−2ε
′) + 2N(7ε2−2ε
′).
By setting ε′ > 72ε2, for example ε
′ = 4ε2 = ε4 , we choose N
so large that 2N(14ε2−4ε
′) ≤ ε2, and then P (N)e2 ≤ 4ε2 = ε4 .
After this step of decoding, user 3 considers k1S and k2S to
share with users 1 and 2, respectively, as the secret keys due
to the source observations.
By the above arguments, the total decoding error probability
is bounded as P (N)e ≤ P (N)e1 + P (N)e2 ≤ ε2 + ε4 < ε.
For correct decoding in the first step, according to P (N)e1
equation, it is necessary that:
r1C+r
′
1C < I(V1;Y3 |V2) , r2C+r′2C < I(V2;Y3 |V1)
r1C+r
′
1C + r2C+r
′
2C < I(V1, V2;Y3)
and hence, considering the rate constraints in Theorem 1, the
functions f1 and f2 can be defined.
Now, we should check the security conditions of definition
1 and show that the indices (k1S , k1C) can be shared as secret
keys between user 1 and user 3 and (k2S , k2C) can be shared
as secret keys between user 2 and user 3. We give the proof
of (3) and by symmetry, (4) can be deduced. We have:
I(K1S ,K1C ;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 ) =
I(K1S ;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 |K1C )︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ I(K1C ;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
Now, we analyze each term separately. We consider ε3 = ε4 =
ε5 = ε6 =
ε
8 . Some Markov chains useful in the security
analysis are given in continue. These Markov chains arise from
the coding scheme.
(UN1 ,U
N
2 )−(K′1S ,K′2S)−(V N1 ,V N2 )−(XN1 ,XN2 )−(Y N1 ,Y N2 ,Y N3 ) (9)
UN1 − SN1 − SN2 − UN2 (10)
V N1 − V N2 −K′2S − UN2 − SN2 (11)
For term A, we have:
I(K1S ;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 |K1C ) ≤ I(K1S ;SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ,K1C)
≤ I(K1S ;SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ,K1C ,K′1S ,K′2S)
(a)
= I(K1S ;S
N
2 ,K
′
1S ,K
′
2S)
(b)
= I(K1S ;S
N
2 ,K
′
1S) = H(K1S)−H(K1S
∣∣SN2 ,K′1S)
= H(K1S)−H(K1S , UN1
∣∣SN2 ,K′1S) +H(UN1 ∣∣SN2 ,K′1S ,K1S)
(c)
≤ H(K1S)−H(K1S , UN1 |SN2 ,K′1S) +Nε3
≤ H(K1S)−H(UN1 |SN2 ,K′1S) +Nε3
≤ H(K1S)−H(UN1 ,K′1S
∣∣SN2 ) +H(K′1S ∣∣SN2 ) +Nε3
(d)
= H(K1S)−H(UN1
∣∣SN2 ) +H(K′1S ∣∣SN2 ) +Nε3
≤ H(K1S)−H(UN1
∣∣SN2 ) +H(K′1S) +Nε3
= N(I(U1;S1)− I(U1;S2) + 2ε′)−H(UN1
∣∣SN2 ) +Nε3
(e)
≤ N(I(U1;S1)−I(U1;S2)+2ε′)−NH(U1 |S2) +Nε4+Nε3
≤ Nε3 + 2Nε′ +Nε4 = N 3ε4 .
In above equations, (a) and (b) follow from Markov chains
(9) and (10), respectively. (c) can be deduced from the same
approach as lemma 2 in [6] to show H(UN1 |SN2 ,M ′1,M1) ≤
Nε3. (d) follows from the fact that k′1S is one of the indices
of uN1 . To prove (e), the same approach as lemma 3 in [6] is
exploited to show NI(U1|S2) ≤ I(UN1 |SN2 ) +Nε4.
For term B, we have:
I(K1C ;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 ) ≤ I(K1C ;SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 , V N2 )
= H(K1C)−H(K1C
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 , V N2 )
= H(K1C)−H(K1C , V N1 |SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 , V N2 )+
H(V N1 |K1C , SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 , V N2 )
(a)
≤ H(K1C)−H(K1C , V N1
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 , V N2 ) +Nε5
(b)
= H(K1C)−H(V N1
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 , V N2 ) +Nε5
(c)
= H(K1C)−H(V N1
∣∣XN2 , Y N2 , V N2 ) +Nε5
(d)
≤ H(K1C)−NH(V1 |X2, Y2, V2 ) +Nε5 +Nε6
(e)
≤ N(I(V1;Y3|V2)− I(V1;X2, Y2|V2))−NH(V1|X2, Y2, V2)+
Nε5 +Nε6
= −NH(V1 |Y3, V2 ) +Nε5 +Nε5
≤ Nε5 +Nε6 = N ε4
In the above equations, (a) can be deduced from the same
approach as lemma 2 in [6] to show H(V N1 |K1C ,XN2 ,Y N2 , V N2 )≤
Nε5. (b) follows from the fact that k1C is one of the indices
of vN1 .(c) can be followed from Markov chain (11). The
same approach as lemma 3 in [6] can be exploited to show
NH(V1|X2,Y2, V2) ≤ H(V N1 |XN2 ,Y N2 ,V N2 )+Nε6. (e) is a direct
consequence of reliable decoding at user 3.
Hence, the security condition (3) is satisfied as:
I(K1S ,K1C ;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 ) ≤ N(
3ε
4
+
ε
4
) = Nε.
To show that the total rate of user 1’s key is sum of r1S
and r1C , we should prove the independency of the keys of the
two steps. When analyzing term A of the security condition,
we show that I(K1S;SN2 ,X
N
2 , Y
N
2 ,K1C) ≤ N 3ε4 and hence
I(K1S ;K1C)≤Nε, and this completes the proof of theorem 1.
APPENDIX II
Proof of the explicit outer bound in Lemma 1
First, users 1 and 2 generate secret keys K1 and K2, re-
spectively, as stochastic functions K1 = f1(SN1 ) and K2 =
f2(S
N
2 ). Then, they determine the channel inputs as stochastic
functions XN1 = f3(S
N
1 ) and X
N
2 = f4(S
N
2 ) and send
them via The GDMMAC. Consequently, Y N1 , Y
N
2 and Y
N
3
are received by user 1, user 2 and user 3, respectively. User
3 should be able to reconstruct the secret keys and according
to Fano’s inequality for an arbitrary small ε > 0:
H(K1,K2|Y N3 , SN3 ) ≤ N(
H(ε)
N
+ε(log |K1||K2|−1)) , Nε1,
where ε1 → 0 if ε→ 0. Also, the following security conditions
should be satisfied as:
I(K1;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 ) < Nε, I(K2;S
N
1 , X
N
1 , Y
N
1 ) < Nε.
Now, we show that for the secret keys satisfying the reliability
and security conditions described above, we can deduce the
explicit outer bound of Lemma 1. We prove the outer bound
on R1 (symmetry can be used for R2).
R1 =
1
N
H(K1)
(a)
≤ 1
N
H(K1
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε
(b)
≤ 1
N
H(K1
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) − 1NH(K1 ∣∣SN3 , Y N3 ) + ε1 + ε
≤ 1
N
I(K1;S
N
3 , Y
N
3
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε1 + ε
≤ 1
N
I(SN1 , X
N
1 ;S
N
3 , Y
N
3
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε1 + ε
= 1
N
I(SN1 , X
N
1 ;S
N
3 |SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 )+
1
N
I(SN1 , X
N
1 ;Y
N
3 |SN3 , SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε1 + ε
= 1
N
(H(SN3
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) −H(SN3 ∣∣SN1 , XN1 ;SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) )
+ 1
N
I(SN1 , X
N
1 ;Y
N
3
∣∣SN3 , SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε1 + ε
≤ 1
N
(H(SN3
∣∣SN2 ) −H(SN3 ∣∣SN1 , XN1 , SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) )
+ 1
N
I(SN1 , X
N
1 ;Y
N
3
∣∣SN3 , SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε1 + ε
(c)
= 1
N
(H(SN3
∣∣SN2 ) −H(SN3 ∣∣SN1 , SN2 ) )
+ 1
N
I(SN1 , X
N
1 ;Y
N
3
∣∣SN3 , SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε1 + ε
≤ 1
N
(I(SN3 ;S
N
1
∣∣SN2 ) ) + 1N (H(Y N3 ∣∣XN2 , Y N2 )
−H(Y N3
∣∣SN1 , XN1 , SN3 , SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) ) + ε1 + ε
(d)
= 1
N
I(SN3 ;S
N
1 |SN2 ) + 1N (H(Y N3 |XN2 , Y N2 )−
H(Y N3 |XN1 , XN2 , Y N2 )) + ε1 + ε
= 1
N
I(SN1 ;S
N
3
∣∣SN2 ) + 1N I(XN1 ;Y N3 ∣∣XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε1 + ε
≤ I(S1;S3 |S2) + I(X1;Y3 |X2, Y2) + ε1 + ε
where (a) results from the security condition, (b) from Fano’s
inequality, (c) from the fact that given (S1, S2), S3 is indepen-
dent of (X1, X2, Y2) and (d) from the fact that given (X1, X2),
Y3 is independent of (S1, S2, S3).
The sum rate upper bound can be deduced from Fano’s
equality.
APPENDIX III
Proof of the converse in Theorem 2
To derive the outer bound in Theorem 2, for an arbitrary small
ε > 0, we use Fano’s inequality and security conditions as:
H(K1,K2|Y N3 , SN3 ) ≤ N(H(ε)N + ε(log |K1||K2| − 1)) , Nε1,
I(K1;S
N
2 , X
N
2 , Y
N
2 ) < Nε, I(K2;S
N
1 , X
N
1 , Y
N
1 ) < Nε,
where ε1 → 0 if ε→ 0. We prove the outer bound of R1. The
outer bound of R2 can be deduced by symmetry.
R1 =
1
N
H(K1)
(a)
≤ 1
N
H(K1
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N2 ) + ε
(b)
≤ 1
N
H(K1
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N3 ) + ε
(c)
≤ 1
N
H(K1
∣∣SN2 , XN2 , Y N3 ) − 1NH(K1 ∣∣SN3 , Y N3 ) + ε1 + ε
≤ 1
N
H(K1|SN2 , XN2 , Y N3 )− 1NH(K1|SN2 , XN2 , SN3 , Y N3 )+ ε1+ε
(d)
= 1
N
H(K1|SN2 , XN1 ,XN2 ,Y N3 )− 1NH(K1|SN2 ,XN1 ,XN2 ,SN3 ,YN3 )+ε1+ε
(e)
= 1
N
H(K1|SN2 ,XN1 ,XN2 )− 1NH(K1|SN2 ,XN1 , XN2 ,SN3)+ε1+ε
≤ 1
N
H(K1
∣∣SN2 , XN1 ) − 1NH(K1 ∣∣SN2 , XN1 , SN3 ) + ε1 + ε
= 1
N
I(K1;S
N
3 |SN2 ,XN1 )+ε1+ε≤ 1N I(K1, XN1 ;SN3 |SN2 )+ε1+ε
= 1
N
∑N
i=1 I(K1, X
N
1 ;S3,i
∣∣SN3,i+1, SN2 ) + ε1 + ε
(f)
= 1
N
∑N
i=1 I(K1, X
N
1 ;S3,i
∣∣SN3,i+1, Si2,1) + ε1 + ε
= 1
N
∑N
i=1[H(S3,i|SN3,i+1, Si2,1)−H(S3,i|SN3,i+1, Si2,1,K1, XN1 )]+ε1+ε
≤ 1
N
∑N
i=1[H(S3,i|S2,i)−H(S3,i|SN3,i+1,Si2,1,Si−11,1 ,K1, XN1 )]+ε1+ε
(g)
=
∑N
i=1 [H(S3,i|S2,i)−H(S3,i|SN3,i+1, S2,i,Si−11,1 ,K1, XN1 )]+ε1+ε
(h)
= 1
N
∑N
i=1 I(U1,i;S3,i |S2,i) + ε1 + ε
(i)
= I(U1,Q;S3,Q |S2,Q) + ε′
where (a) results from the security condition, (b) from the
Markov chain (X1,X2)−Y2−Y3, (c) from Fano’s inequality,
(d) from the fact that H(X1|X2,Y3) = 0, (e) from the fact that
given (X1,X2), Y3 is independent of (S1,S2,S3),(f) from the fact
that given SN3,i+1,(K1, X
N
1 ) is independent of S
N
2,i+1 which is
the direct consequence of the Markov chain S1−S3−S2 , (g)
from the Markov chain S3,i−(SN3,i+1,S2,i,Si−11,1 ,K1,XN1 )−Si−12,1
which arises because (K1, XN1 ) is a function of S
N
1 , (h) from
the definition of the random variable U1,i as:
U1,i = (S
N
3,i+1, S
i−1
1,1 ,K1, X
N
1 )
and (i) from the definition of the random variable Q which
is uniformly distributed on {1,2, ...,N} and setting ε′= ε1+
ε. With the same approaches as above, we have R2 ≤
I(U2,Q;S3,Q|S1,Q) + ε′ where U2,i is defined as U2,i =
(Si−13,1 ,S
N
2,i+1,K2,X
N
2 ). It can be seen that the defined random
variables satisfy the distribution of theorem 2.
To prove the rate constraints of Theorem 2, we have:
NI(X1;Y3 |X2) ≥ I(XN1 ;Y N3
∣∣XN2 ) ≥ I(SN1 ;Y N3 ∣∣XN2 )
(a)
≥ I(SN1 ;Y N3
∣∣XN2 ) +H(K1 ∣∣SN3 , Y N3 , XN2 ) −Nε1
≥ I(SN1 ;YN3 |XN2 )+H(K1|SN3 , Y N3 , XN2 )−H(K1|SN1 , Y N3 , XN2 )−Nε1
= I(SN1 ;Y
N
3 ,K1
∣∣XN2 ) − I(SN3 ;K1 ∣∣Y N3 , XN2 ) −Nε1
≥ I(SN1 ;Y N3 ,K1
∣∣XN2 ) − I(SN3 ;Y N3 ,K1 ∣∣XN2 ) −Nε1
(b)
= I(SN1 ;Y
N
3 ,K1, X
N
1
∣∣XN2 ) − I(SN3 ;Y N3 ,K1, XN1 ∣∣XN2 ) −Nε1
(c)
= I(SN1 ;K1, X
N
1
∣∣XN2 ) − I(SN3 ;K1, XN1 ∣∣XN2 ) −Nε1
(d)
= H(K1, X
N
1
∣∣SN3 ) − I(K1, XN1 ∣∣SN1 ) −Nε1
=I(SN1 ;K1, X
N
1 )−I(SN3 ;K1, XN1 )−Nε1
=I(K1, X
N
1 ;S
N
1 |SN3 )−Nε1=
∑N
i=1 I(K1, X
N
1 ;S1,i|SN3 , Si−11,1 )−Nε1
=
∑N
i=1 I(K1, X
N
1 ;S1,i
∣∣SN3,i, Si−11,1 ) −Nε1
=
∑N
i=1[H(S1,i |S3,i) −H(S1,i
∣∣SN3,i, Si−11,1 ,K1, XN1 )] −Nε1
=
∑N
i=1 I(K1, X
N
1 , S
N
3,i+1, S
i−1
1,1 ;S1,i |S3,i) −Nε1
= I(U1,Q;S1,Q |S3,Q) −Nε1.
In the above equations, (a) results from Fano’s inequality,
(b) from the fact that H(X1|X2,Y3)=0, (c) from the fact that
given (X1,X2), Y3 is independent of (S1, S2, S3) and (d) from
the Markov chain (SN1 ,K1,XN1 )−SN3 −(SN2 ,K2,XN2 ).
With the same approaches, we have NI(X2;Y3|X1) ≥
I(U2,Q;S2,Q|S3,Q)−Nε1.
For the sum rate constraint, we have:∑N
i=1 I(U1,i, U2,i;S1,i, S2,i|S3,i)
=
∑N
i=1 I(K1, X
N
1 , S
N
3,i+1,S
i−1
1,1 ,K2, X
N
2 , S
i−1
3,1 , S
N
2,i+1;S1,i, S2,i|S3,i)
=
∑N
i=1[H(S1,i, S2,i|S3,i)−
H(S1,i, S2,i|K1, XN1 , Si−11,1 ,K2, XN2 , SN2,i+1, SN3 )]
=
∑N
i=1[H(S1,i, S2,i|S3,i)−H(S1,i|K1, XN1 , Si−11,1 , SN3 )−
H(S2,i|K2, XN2 , SN2,i+1, SN3 )]
= H(SN1 , S
N
2 |SN3 )−H(SN1 |K1, XN1 , SN3 )−H(SN2 |K2, XN2 , SN3 )
≤ H(SN1 , SN2 |SN3 )−H(SN1 |K1, XN1 , XN2 , Y N3 , SN3 )−
H(SN2 |K2, XN1 , XN2 , Y N3 , SN3 )
=H(SN1 , S
N
2 |SN3 )−H(SN1 |K1, XN2 , Y N3 , SN3 )−
H(SN2 |K2, XN1 , Y N3 , SN3 )
(a)
= H(SN1 , S
N
2
∣∣SN3 )−H(SN1 ∣∣K1, Y N3 , SN3 )−H(SN2 ∣∣K2, Y N3 , SN3 )
≤ I(SN1 , SN2 ;K1,K2, Y N3 |SN3 )
= H(K1,K2, Y
N
3
∣∣SN3 )−H(K1,K2, Y N3 ∣∣SN3 , SN1 , SN2 )
(b)
≤ H(Y N3
∣∣SN3 )−H(Y N3 ∣∣SN3 , SN1 , SN2 ) +Nε1
≤ H(Y N3 )−H(Y N3
∣∣XN1 , XN2 , SN3 , SN1 , SN2 ) +Nε1
= H(Y N3 )−H(Y N3
∣∣XN1 , XN2 ) +Nε1 = I(XN1 , XN2 ;Y N3 ) +Nε1
≤ NI(X1, X2;Y3) +Nε1
In the above equations, (a) results from the Markov chain
(SN1 ,K1, X
N
1 )− SN3 − (SN2 ,K2,XN2 ) and (b) from Fano’s
inequality.
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